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North Korean Detention of U.S. Citizens:
International Law Violations and
Means for Recourse
Patricia Goedde† & Andrew Wolman††
North Korean detention of U.S. citizens has prompted considerable
attention in the U.S. media over the years, especially with the most recent
case of Otto Warmbier’s death.  Releases have usually been negotiated
through diplomatic channels on a humanitarian basis.  While detainee
treatment is influenced primarily by political considerations, this Article
asks what international legal implications arise from these detentions in
terms of international law violations and recourse.  Specifically, this Arti-
cle analyzes (1) violations of consular law and international human rights
law as applied to the detainees, such as standards for arrest, investigation,
trial, and detention, and (2) whether viable legal recourse exists.  While
North Korea has acted contrary to international law in its treatment of U.S.
detainees in a number of respects, including through violations of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and other treaties and principles of customary
law, legal recourse is practically limited in both international and U.S.
domestic law due to jurisdictional barriers and weak international enforce-
ment mechanisms.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 R
I. International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 R
II. Consular Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 R
III. North Korean Criminal Law as Applied to U.S.
Detainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 R
IV. International Human Rights Law as Applied to U.S.
Detainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 R
A. Arrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 R
B. Investigation and Preliminary Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 R
C. Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 R
D. Sentencing and Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 R
E. Detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 R
F. Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 R
V. International and Domestic Legal Recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 R
† Associate Professor, Sungkyunkwan University, School of Law, Seoul, Korea.
Prof. Goedde’s work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of
Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A3A2925085).
†† Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Graduate School of
International and Area Studies. Prof. Wolman’s work was supported by the 2017
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund.
51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 147 (2018)
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN105.txt unknown Seq: 2 27-AUG-18 14:53
148 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
A. Travel Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 R
B. Individual Complaint Mechanisms at the International
Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 R
C. U.S. Private Law Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 R
D. State to State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 R
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 R
Introduction
On January 2, 2016, North Korean authorities detained University of
Virginia student Otto Warmbier as he was about to leave the Pyongyang
airport.1  According to North Korean authorities, Warmbier had stolen a
propaganda banner from the wall of his hotel.2  This was deemed to be a
“hostile act.”3  After detaining him for several weeks, North Korean authori-
ties released a video of Warmbier confessing to his crime, and tearfully
begging for mercy.4  Despite his pleas, on March 16, 2016, the North
Korean Supreme Court convicted Warmbier after a one-hour trial and sen-
tenced him to fifteen years of hard labor.5  After a year and a half,
Warmbier was medically evacuated back to the United States in a coma,
passing away several days later.  The exact cause of death remains a mys-
tery given U.S. physicians’ refutation of the North Korean claim that botu-
lism and a sleeping pill had induced the coma, the severe neurological
degeneration in his brain, and his burial without an autopsy.
North Korea still detains three other American citizens.6  Kim Dong-
chul was arrested in October 2015 and sentenced on April 29, 2016 to ten
years of hard labor for espionage, having allegedly attempted to transfer
North Korean military data with a USB flash drive.7  An accounting profes-
1. Nash Jenkins, How Otto Warmbier Made It Out of North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (June
14, 2017), http://time.com/4817541/otto-warmbier-north-korea-us/ [https://perma.cc/
8GC3-YHYK].
2. Id.
3. Choe Sang-Hun & Rick Gladstone, North Korea Sentences Otto Warmbier, U.S.
Student, to 15 Years’ Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
03/17/world/asia/north-korea-otto-warmbier-sentenced.html [https://perma.cc/X4SE-
ZPT9].
4. He somewhat improbably claimed that a church member had offered to trade
him a used car for the stolen propaganda poster. Id.
5. Id.
6. Russell Goldman, 3 Americans Remain Imprisoned in North Korea, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/asia/north-korea-ameri
can-prisoner.html [https://perma.cc/TCV4-U5HV].
7. Steph Solis, Report: North Korea Sentences U.S. Citizen to 10 years in prison for
espionage, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/
2016/04/29/north-korea-sentences-korean-us-citizen-10-years-jail-espionage/83689282/
[https://perma.cc/J3FA-MUAR]; see also ”,
ISPLUS (Apr. 29, 2016), http://news.donga.com/Main/3/all/20160429/77855825/1
[https://perma.cc/X75Y-RCK6].  While Kim confessed on video to espionage, his con-
fession was speculated to have been made under duress. See James Rothwell, What Hap-
pens to Foreigners Arrested in North Korea?, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 25, 2016), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/25/what-happens-to-foreigners-arrested-in-north-
korea/ [https://perma.cc/D2ZL-L37Q].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN105.txt unknown Seq: 3 27-AUG-18 14:53
2018 North Korean Detention of U.S. Citizens 149
sor at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), Tony Kim
(Kim Sang-duk) was arrested on April 22, 2017, on charges of hostile acts.8
He was suspected of missionary activities outside his teaching.9  Kim Hak-
song, a pastor and also a PUST teacher working on agricultural projects,
was arrested shortly after on similar charges.10
Except for Warmbier’s tragic death, these cases are not altogether
unique.  Since 1996, North Korean authorities have detained at least four-
teen other U.S. nationals for purported crimes in the country: Evan
Hunziker (1996); Kwang-Duk Lee (1998); James Chin-Kyung Kim (1998);
Karen Jung-Sook Han (1999); So Sun Dok (1999); Euna Lee and Laura
Ling (2009); Robert Park (2009-10); Aijalon Gomes (2010); Eddie Jun
(2010-11); Kenneth Bae (2012-14); Merrill Newman (2013); Matthew
Miller (2014), and Jeffrey Fowle (2014).11  Most were charged with illegal
entry, anti-state crimes, or espionage, often in connection with missionary
activity.12  Several of these cases were heavily publicized in the United
States and created significant diplomatic tensions.13  In all cases, North
Korea eventually released the detainees and sent them back to the U.S.,
usually as a result of a visit by a high-level U.S. envoy such as former Con-
gressman Bill Richardson (for Evan Hunziker), former Senator Robert Tor-
ricelli (for Karen Jung-Sook Han), former president Bill Clinton (for Laura
Ling and Euna Lee), former president Jimmy Carter (for Aijalon Gomes),
Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Robert King (for Eddie Jun),
and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper (for Kenneth Bae and
Matthew Miller).14  A handful of non-U.S. citizens (including Canadian,
Australian, and South Koreans) have also been detained in a similar man-
8. Julia Carrie Wong, The Three US Citizens Still Detained in North Korea, THE
GUARDIAN (June 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/19/north-
korea-detainees-us-citizens-otto-warmbier [https://perma.cc/28DX-PWE9].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. US Detainees in the DPRK, NAT’L COMM. ON N. KOR., www.ncnk.org/resources/
publications/US_detainee_issue_brief.pdf  (last updated Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter U.S.
Detainees] [https://perma.cc/5X7P-KYV6]. Perhaps coincidentally, the gap in deten-
tions from 1999 to 2009 roughly tracks a period of decreased tensions on the peninsula
corresponding to the presidencies of Kim Dae Jung (1998– 2003) and Roh Moo Hyun
(2003-2008); see Daniel Wertz, Inter-Korean Relations, NAT’L COMM. ON N. KOR., https://
www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/inter-korean-relations (last
updated Jan. 2017) [https://perma.cc/K69Y-QVSH].
12. See U.S. Detainees.
13. For a summary, see Siobhan O’Grady, North Korea Loves Accusing Americans of
‘Hostile Acts’. That’s Because ‘Hostile Acts’ can be Just About Anything’, FOREIGN POLICY
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/north-korea-loves-accusing-amer
icans-of-hostile-acts-thats-because-hostile-acts-can-be-just-about-anything/ [https://
perma.cc/Y427-PAYY].
14. Rothwell, supra note 7; Barbara Demick, Why did North Korea Release Kenneth R
Bae and Matthew Todd Miller?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.newyorker.
com/news/news-desk/north-korea-release-kenneth-bae-matthew-todd-miller [https://
perma.cc/L3CQ-5SCY]; Justin Rohrlich, Exclusive: American Defector Home Safely from
North Korea, NK NEWS (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nknews.org/2016/04/exclusive-
american-defector-home-safely-from-north-korea/ (“it nearly always takes a high-level
U.S. envoy to free Americans who find themselves in North Korea under less-than-ideal
circumstances”) [https://perma.cc/H4W4-5CEM].
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ner during this period, leading to similar tensions between their home
countries and the North Korean government.15
While these detentions have prompted considerable attention in the
U.S. media, especially upon Warmbier’s death, they have been the subject
of little academic study.  Existing commentary has generally approached
such detentions from the perspectives of politics and international rela-
tions.16  Commentators have suggested that the detentions are politically
motivated, with various political considerations influencing detainee treat-
ment, and changes in the political climate or diplomatic concessions lead-
ing to the eventual solution of particular cases.17  This perspective is
certainly valid; political considerations infuse all of the North Korean
regime’s actions, including those of its court system.  However, North
Korean detention of U.S. nationals is also a legal act with significant impli-
cations as a matter of North Korean law, international law, and even (in
some cases) U.S. law.  This Article asks whether and how any substantive
or procedural aspects of North Korean detention of U.S. citizens violate
international legal norms and what would be the possible avenues of
recourse where North Korea’s actions violate such relevant norms.
Part I briefly explains the international legal framework applied for
this Article, and Part II examines the international legal implications of
consular law regarding these detentions.  Part III analyzes how North
Korea’s criminal law applies to U.S. detainees, while Part IV reviews inter-
national human rights law as applied to the detainees, such as standards
for arrest, investigation, trial, and detention.  Part V discusses U.S. legisla-
tive responses and potential remedies through international mechanisms
or within the United States for any such violations.  This Article concludes
that North Korea has acted contrary to international law in its treatment of
U.S. detainees in a number of respects, including through violations of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),18 the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),19 and other treaties and princi-
ples of customary law, but that, failing diplomatic solutions, legal recourse
is practically limited due to jurisdictional barriers and generally weak (or
non-existent) international enforcement mechanisms, thus making it diffi-
cult to hold the North Korean government or its state officials accountable.
15. Associated Press, U.S. Citizens and Foreigners Detained in North Korea: A List,
USA TODAY (May 8, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/08/
north-korea-us-citizens-and-other-foreigners-detained/101423080/ [https://perma.cc/
X65V-C93G].
16. See Nash Jenkins, The U.S. has Called on North Korea to Release a Detained Ameri-
can Student, TIME (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4262320/otto-warmbier-north-
korea-student/ [https://perma.cc/3HA8-L9HB]; Demick, supra note 14. R
17. Choe & Gladstone, supra note 3. R
18. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, T.I.A.S No 7502, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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I. International Law
As a starting point, Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prohibits states
from “intervene[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.”20  As such, it is worth stressing that North Korea
has the sovereign right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts taking
place within its territory, and to judge and punish violations of its criminal
law.21  However, as detailed below, treaties and customary international
law do impose various limitations to this sovereign right to legislate, arrest,
and punish.22
The analysis undertaken in this Article is based on two fundamental
assumptions.  First, it assumes that detainees have been arrested while in
North Korea.  Although North Korea has in the recent past abducted its
own and foreign citizens from neighboring countries,23 it does not seem to
have done so with the U.S. nationals discussed in this paper (although
there is some debate as to whether Laura Ling and Euna Lee were actually
captured on Chinese or North Korean territory).24  Needless to say, addi-
tional grounds potentially exist for finding violations of international law if
abductions from outside the country were involved.  According to basic
sovereignty norms, abductions of individuals from a foreign nation for
20. U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 7, Oct. 24, 1045, 1 U.N.T.S 16.
21. MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 149– 50 (7th ed. 2013) (“ . . . it
is a fundamental rule of international law that the jurisdiction of a state within its own
territory is complete and absolute. . . . This is a basic attribute of sovereignty and flows
from the very existence of the state as an international legal person.”).
22. Id. at 150.
23. Since the end of the war, 3835 South Korean citizens have been abducted by
North Korea, according to the Institute for National Unification, most of whom were
fishermen taken at sea.  Fred Ross III & Jae Chun Won, North Korean Kidnappers: A
Response to Illegal Abductions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Before the Work-
ing Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, 9 REGENT J. INT’L L. 277, 282
(2013); see U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
DPRK, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
DPRK, ¶¶  924– 82, A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter, ‘COI Report’] (finding
that since 1950, the DPRK government has systematically kidnapped nationals from
South Korea, Japan, China, Thailand, Europe and the Middle East).
24. Peter Foster, US Reporters ‘Dragged Across North Korean Border’ in Arrest, TELE-
GRAPH (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/
6125752/US-reporters-dragged-across-North-Korean-border-in-arrest.html (reporting
claims that “We were firmly back inside China when the soldiers apprehended us”)
[https://perma.cc/2ZRT-PLFJ].  It is also worth noting that Kim Dong Shik was
abducted by North Korea from well within China; he was a U.S. permanent resident but
not a citizen. Andrew Wolman, Han Kim and North Korean Accountability for Torture and
Unlawful Killing, 10 J.E. ASIAN & INT’L. L. 273, 275 (2017) (“On January 16, 2000, Pastor
Kim was abducted by North Korean agents while leaving a restaurant in Yanji, China”).
There is well-publicized suspicion of North Korean abduction of a U.S. citizen while in
China in 2004, but reports that the individual is living inside North Korea remain
unconfirmed. See, e.g., K.J. Kwon & Ben Westcott, Did North Korea Abduct Missing U.S.
Student David Sneddon, CNN (Sept. 2, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/02/asia/
david-sneddon-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/4RHJ-N9NF].  This case has recently
been the subject of renewed investigation by the Trump administration. Wan-Jun Yun,
U.S. Finds Facts on N. Korea’s Alleged Kidnapping of College Student, DONG-A ILBO (Feb. 7,
2017), http://english.donga.com/List/3/03/26/842426/1.
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whatever purpose constitute violations of international law.25
Second, it assumes that North Korea and the United States are not
currently in a state of armed conflict, and, therefore, the Geneva Conven-
tions (and international humanitarian law in general) are not applicable.
While this assumption may appear obvious on its face given the absence of
fighting between the two parties, it is complicated by the fact that the
Korean War ended in an armistice rather than an actual peace agree-
ment.26  It is often said that the U.S. and North Korea are still at war.27
One scholar has characterized the situation as a status mixtus where peace-
time laws apply except when there are actual armed hostilities.28  In
August 2016, North Korean authorities declared that Warmbier and Kim
Dong-chul would be deemed prisoners of war due to the imposition of U.S.
sanctions, which they consider tantamount to a declaration of war.29  For-
mer U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson later accepted this charac-
terization and claimed that North Korea was responsible for Warmbier’s
death under the Geneva Conventions.30  These statements should be seen
as more rhetorical than legal, however.  While the Geneva Conventions by
their terms are applicable in times of “armed conflict” or “declared war,”31
25. See Matteo M. Winkler, When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal: International Law
and European Reaction to the United States Rendition Program, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 33, 48 (2008); see also O’calan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 § 93 (May 15,
2005); S.C. Res. 138 (June 23, 1960); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  For an opposing
opinion, see Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 619 (June 18, 2002) (find-
ing no clear, binding obligation in customary international law to refrain from trans-
border kidnapping).
26. Agreement Between the Commander-In-Chief, United Nations Command, on the
One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Com-
mander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military
Armistice in Korea, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234.
27. See, e.g., Trump: ‘Sad Day’ for North Korea if Military Attacks, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 8,
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/trump-sad-day-north-korea-military-
strikes-170907225959147.html [https://perma.cc/NH77-LPR5]; Tom Phillips, U.S.
Must Stop North Korea Threats, says China, as Kim Jon-Un Aims for Military ‘Eqilibrium’,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/16/us-
must-stop-north-korea-threats-says-china-kim-jong-un-military-equilibrium [https://
perma.cc/MU83-H2U5]; Jesse Johnson, North Korea says U.S. has ‘Declared War’, warns
it may Shoot Down Warplanes as Risk of Escalation Grows, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/26/asia-pacific/north-korea-says-u-s-
declared-war-warns-shoot-american-bombers/ [https://perma.cc/56AU-BTLK].
28. Seunghyun Sally Nam, War on the Korean Peninsula? Application of Jus in Bello in
the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island Attacks, 8 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 43, 80 (2013).
29. Michael Edison Hayden and Bob Woodruff, North Korea Tells ABC News: ‘No
Exception’ to US Detainees Being Subject to Wartime Laws, ABC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2016 3:47
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/International/north-korea-warns-us-prisoners-dealt-war-
time-laws/story?id=41092793 [https://perma.cc/22E3-SH96].
30. Bill Richardson, America’s Hostage Negotiation Strategy is Broken, WASH. POST
(June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/
22/bill-richardson-americas-hostage-negotiation-strategy-is-broken/ [http://perma.cc/
VXQ4-AG4K].
31. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, Aug. 12, 1949.
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this latter condition is now seen as outdated by commentators.32  Thus, the
question remains of whether an armed conflict exists.  According to a defi-
nition proposed by the International Law Association based on its reading
of various other authorities, an “armed conflict” requires, at a minimum,
organized armed groups “[e]ngaged in fighting of some intensity.”33  By
this definition, there is currently no armed conflict between the U.S. and
North Korea.
II. Consular Access
Whenever a foreign national is arrested, Article 36 of the VCCR
requires that consular officials be given access to the detained individual,
in order to “correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representa-
tion.”34  Both North Korea and the United States are parties to the VCCR,
and its provisions on consular access represent longstanding customary
international law.35  Consular access is sometimes also treated as a human
right,36 and is explicitly protected in the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (which neither the
United States nor North Korea has ratified).37  The UN Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the UN Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment also
contain the principle of consular access for foreign prisoners.38  As the
32. Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 283, 304 (1987) “[i]t is the factual concept of armed conflict rather
than the technical concept of war which makes [the rules of war] applicable.”; JEAN S.
PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 32 (1952) (“The Convention
becomes applicable as from the actual opening of hostilities.”).
33. INT’L LAW ASSOC., FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 2 (2010)
34. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(c), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
35. Alyssa L. Enzor, Ignoring the Obligation to Provide Consular Notification: How This
Nation’s Approach to Treaties Deprives Criminal Defendants of Procedural Safeguards, 3
ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 123, 129 (2013) (VCCR “is widely considered to be a codifica-
tion of customary international law”): Mark Warren, Rendered Meaningless? Security
Detentions and the Erosion of Consular Access Rights, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 27, 29 (2013)
(“International law has long recognized the customary right of consulates to assist and
protect nationals detained abroad”).
36. See, e.g., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of
the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.)
No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999), p. 35; Christina M. Cerna, The Right to Consular Notification As A
Human Right, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 419, 422– 23 (2008).
37. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 14 IHRR 582, art. 17(2)(d) (“any person deprived of liberty
shall be authorized . . . if he or she is a foreigner, to communicate with his or her consu-
lar authorities, in accordance with applicable international law.”).
38. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted Aug. 30, 1955
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, E.S.C. Res. 663C, Annex 1, at 11, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF/611 (July 31, 1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, at 35, U.N. ESCOR,
32nd Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (May 13, 1977), art. 38(2); Body of Princi-
ples for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988), Princ. 16(2).
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United States does not have an embassy in North Korea or diplomatic ties
with the country, Sweden acts as a protecting power for the United States,
including with respect to consular assistance.39  With respect to U.S.
nationals detained to date, North Korea has, in general, eventually allowed
Swedish officials to visit the detainee, and to attend any trial.40  There
have, however, sometimes been questions as to whether North Korea has
permitted the initial consular visit promptly enough, and has allowed sub-
sequent visits with sufficient frequency.
The promptness of the first consular visit has been a particular bone
of contention in several cases.  For example, it took over a month for Mer-
rill Newman to receive access to Swedish officials, despite regular
requests.41  Matthew Miller had to wait at least seven weeks for consular
access.42  Laura Ling and Euna Lee also had to wait over a month for con-
sular access.43  These relatively long delays arguably violate international
law.  According to the VCCR, consular officials must be notified of the
arrest of a foreign national “without delay,” and consular officials, in turn,
have the right to communicate with the detainee “without delay.”44  The
International Court of Justice has interpreted the phrase “without delay” as
not necessarily meaning “immediately upon arrest,” but rather signifying
that authorities must inform arrested individuals of their consular rights
“as soon as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there
are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national.”45  The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted “without delay” to
require that advice about consular access be given at the time of arrest, or
at least prior to interrogation.46  In practice, states have insisted on access
39. Sweden is a protecting power for Australia, Canada, and the U.S. Magnus Ander-
sson and Jinsun Bae, Sweden’s Engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
11 N. KOR. REV. 42, 52.
40. KOR. INST. NAT’L UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA
2015, 157 (2016) [hereinafter KINU WHITE PAPER 2015]  (citing the cases of Robert
Park, Kenneth Bae, Jeon Yong-Soo, Laura Ling, Euna Lee and Aijalon Gomes).
41. Dana Feldman, No Word from American Detained in North Korea, Son Says, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/no-word-american-
detained-north-korea-son-says-f2D11641595 [https://perma.cc/9M68-AWZZ]; AFP, US
Calls for ‘Immediate Release’ of 85-Year Old Tourist Held in North Korea, TELEGRAPH (Dec.
1, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10486576/
US-calls-for-immediate-release-of-85-year-old-tourist-held-in-North-Korea.html [https://
perma.cc/FW7F-MBZ2].
42. Steven Borowiec, North Korea Says it Will Put 2 Americans on Trial for ‘Hostile
Acts’, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-
indict-20140629-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y4PZ-T9WE].
43. Chris Green, 43 Days and Counting, DAILY NK (May 12, 2009).  http://
www.dailynk.com/english/m/read.php?cataId=NK00100&num=4899 [https://
perma.cc/Y3GR-XXYF].
44. VCCR, supra note 18, art. 36(1)(b). R
45. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment,
2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 88 (Mar. 31).
46. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guar-
antees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 16, 64 (Oct. 1, 1999).
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in a matter of days,47 and have tended to specify consular notification lim-
its of between two and four days into their bilateral consular conven-
tions.48  Judging by these guidelines, North Korea has, in some cases,
violated the VCCR by denying prompt consular access.49
The frequency of consular visits has been another recurring issue.
During Warmbier’s eighteen-month detention, he was reportedly in contact
only once with the Swedish Embassy, in the first week of March before he
went to trial.50  In addition, despite requests from the embassy, North
Korea did not allow a follow-up consular visit to Kenneth Bae for almost
four months.51  Laura Ling and Euna Lee were denied visits for at least
forty-three days, which, at the time, the U.S. claimed was contrary to the
VCCR.52  While the VCCR does not specify how frequently visits must be
allowed, it does specify that “consular officers shall be free to communicate
with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.”53  Thus,
the question is whether such infrequent visits qualify as free access.
Although there is little jurisprudential guidance on this issue, a number of
bilateral consular conventions specify that intervals between visits should
be no longer than one or two months.54  Although Principle 15 of the U.N.
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Deten-
47. See Britain Slams Yugoslavia in Hostage Crisis, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY
(Aug. 25, 2008), https://www.rferl.org/a/1142225.html (arguing that 10-day delay in
consular access was inaccessible) [https://perma.cc/9SPP-TEGV]; see Ottawa Demands
Access to Held Canadians, UPI (Aug. 4, 2000), https://www.upi.com/Archives/2000/08/
04/Ottawa-demands-access-to-held-Canadians/3844965361600/?spt=SU (stressing the
need for immediate consular access after three days) [https://perma.cc/6ZBW-6MTB].
For US decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Miranda 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1005 (D.
Minn. 1999) (two-day notification delay violates VCCR); United States v. Santos, 235
F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 2000) (four-day delay violated VCCR).
48. See, e.g., Consular Convention Between the People’s Republic of China and the
the United States of America, China-U.S., art. 35, Sept. 17, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 2973 (four
days).
49. It must be noted, however, that the U.S. does not have an entirely pristine record
of respecting the art. 36 prompt access obligations, either; this could diminish the likeli-
hood of foreign countries respecting those obligations vis-a`-vis U.S. nationals. See Sarah
H. Lee, Strangers in A Strange Land: The Threat to Consular Rights of Americans Abroad
After Medellin v. Texas, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1519, 1542 (2009); see Cindy Galway Buys,
Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 38 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 57, 64 (2013) (“Unfortunately, law enforcement authorities in the United
States have not always provided consular notification and access as required”).
50. Rick Gladstone, Few Consular Visits for American Held in North, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/north-korea-otto-
warmbier.html [https://perma.cc/LA2W-VG3J].
51. North Korea Allows Consular Access to Bae, KOREA TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/116_162871.html [https://
perma.cc/WG6Q-5238].
52. Green, supra note 43. R
53. VCCR, supra note 18, art. 36(1)(a). R
54. See, e.g., Agreement on Consular Relations between the Government of New Zea-
land and the People’s Republic of China, China-NZ, art. 11, Oct. 26, 2003 (one month);
Consular Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, Russ.-S.
Kor., art. 39(3), Mar. 18, 1992 (two months); Consular Convention between the United
States of American and the Hungarian People’s Republic, Hung.-U.S., art. 41(4), July 7,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 1141 (one month).
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tion or Imprisonment does not specifically deal with consular access, it
states that barring exceptional circumstances, “communication of the
detained or imprisoned person with the outside world . . . shall not be
denied for more than a matter of days.”55  If these intervals are taken as
reasonable limits, then one can plausibly argue that North Korea’s reluc-
tance to allow more frequent access to Bae and others constitutes a denial
of “free access” in contravention of its VCCR obligations.
Interestingly, North Korea justified denying Canadian consular access
to a formerly detained Canadian (Hyeon-Soo Lim) during the investigative
phase of the trial, by claiming that doing so was justified under North
Korea’s domestic law.56  North Korea argued via its state-owned KCNA
news service that VCCR art. 36(2) makes consular access obligations sub-
ject to controlling domestic law.57  This is an ungrounded but not an
unprecedented interpretation; the same argument was also made in a simi-
lar context by Argentine military officials to justify the incommunicado
detention of U.S. nationals in 1976.58  U.S. officials rejected the argument
at the time, however, as another part of art. 36(2) states that “the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.”59  In fact, it
would defeat the purpose of the VCCR (as well as run counter to its plain
language) to subjugate access to a country’s domestic laws.60
III. North Korean Criminal Law as Applied to U.S. Detainees
While most of the earlier U.S. detainees were charged with illegal
entry into North Korea, packaged with some variation of crimes against the
state, the four most recently detained U.S. citizens were charged with hos-
tile acts against the state or espionage during their stay in North Korea.61
For example journalists Eunha Lee and Laura Ling were sentenced for
“aggression against the Korean nation” and illegal border crossing, the for-
mer being a far more serious charge.62  Warmbier was charged with con-
55. G.A. Res. 43/173, supra note 38, at principle 15.  Extended incommunicado R
detention can also violate article 10 of the ICCPR. See Arutyunyan v. Uzbekistan,
Comm. 917/2000, U.N. Doc. A/59/40, Vol. II, at 96 (HRC 2004); Arzuaga Gilboa v.
Uruguay, Communication No. 147/1983, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 176 (1990) (15
day incommunicado detention violates article 10(1)).
56. J.H. Ahn, North Korea Warns Canada not to Interfere with Pastor’s Sentence, NK
NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.nknews.org/2015/12/n-korea-warns-canada-not-to-
interfere-with-pastors-sentence/ [https://perma.cc/9PJJ-9FN2].
57. See VCCR, supra note 18, art. 36(2) (“rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this R
Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State”).
58. Warren, supra note 35, at 34– 35. R
59. VCCR, supra note 18, art. 36(2). R
60. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
61. Rothwell, supra note 7. R
62. The Criminal Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2009, arts. 69,
233 [hereinafter DPRK Criminal Law (2009)].
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spiracy to subvert the state, while Kim Dong-chul was charged for
espionage as well as conspiracy to subvert the state.63  Their sentences
ranged between ten and fifteen years.64
North Korean criminal law justifies these charges and harsh sentences.
Consisting of 290 articles, North Korea’s Criminal Law was extensively
revised and publicly disclosed in 2004, with several subsequent amend-
ments to the law since.65  The Criminal Law states that it applies not only
to its citizens who commit offenses in and outside of North Korean terri-
tory, but also to foreigners who commit offenses within its territory.66
Offenses are defined as punishable, dangerous acts violating state sover-
eignty, the socialist system, and law and order, either intentionally or
negligently.67
The offenses usually relevant to foreign detainees mainly fall within
the categories of “crimes against the state” or “crimes against the people.”
“Crimes against the state” include: conspiracy to subvert the state, terror-
ism, anti-state propaganda and agitation, treason against the homeland,
espionage, sabotage, inducement of armed intervention and severance of
diplomatic relationship, and aggression against foreigners.68  “Crimes
against the people” include: treason against the nation, suppression of the
national liberation struggle, and aggression against the nation.69  As
related to foreigners, “crimes against the people” would apply to any for-
eign national who “suppresses the national liberation struggle . . . or . . .
reunification,” or with hostile intentions “violates the personal liberty or
property of a Korean national . . . abroad” or “causes national
dissension.”70
Most of the provisions under “crimes against the state” apply generally
to anyone without regard to their citizenship or nationality.  However, espi-
onage applies specifically to any non-citizen “who detects, collects or trans-
mits secrets with the intention of espionage against the Republic,”71 while
“treason against the homeland” is reserved for North Korean citizens spe-
cifically.72  “Inducement of armed intervention and severance of diplo-
matic relationship” applies to foreign nationals only.73  A number of terms
63. Rothwell, supra note 7. R
64. Tiffany Ap & Brian Todd, North Korea Sentences U.S. Student to 15 Years Hard
Labor, CNN (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/16/asia/north-korea-
warmbier-sentenced/index.html [https://perma.cc/H8XV-RXSB]; Choe Sang-Hun, North
Korea Sentences American to 10 Years for Spying, Reports Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-kim-dong-chul-sen
tence.html [https://perma.cc/Z2SM-JSND].
65. DPRK Criminal Law (2009), supra note 62 R
66. Id. art. 8.
67. Id. art. 10.
68. Id. arts. 60– 67.  Some of the translated terms are borrowed from the English
translation of the DPRK Criminal Law.
69. Id. arts. 68, 69, 70.
70. Id. arts. 69, 70.
71. Id. art. 64.
72. Id. arts. 62, 67.
73. Id. art. 66.
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are both undefined and overly broad, such as “anti-state purposes,” “con-
spiracy to subvert,” “propaganda and agitation,” and “sabotage.”  These
terms allow for broad interpretation by the North Korean authorities and
thus increase the risk of foreigners unwittingly committing a criminal
offense.
Historically, North Korean authorities have found additional subver-
sive intent beyond the face of what appears to be a general crime, thus
adding an additional layer of anti-state criminality, resulting in a cumula-
tive effect of a plurality of offenses for a single act.  As Hahm Pyong-choon
explains the history of criminal law under North Korean socialist legality:
A simple theft of state property easily merges into counter-revolutionary
crimes . . . Every North Korean writer on the subject of law . . . emphasize[s]
the interrelatedness of the ordinary and anti-state crimes [and] point out
that anti-state crimes are often committed under the guise of ordinary
crimes . . . . The prosecution and court personnel are constantly exhorted to
look beyond and beneath the visible facts of the case to uncover the more
sinister and reprehensible machinations of counterrevolutionary
elements.74
Thus, the North Korean government can transform what may be perceived
as a minor transgression in the first instance (e.g., theft of a government
banner, crossing a border, leaving a bible) into various serious crimes of
political rebellion.
As for punishment, the crime of “conspiracy to subvert the state” car-
ries a sentence of at least five years of reform through labor, while punish-
ment for a “grave offense” of this crime can be life-term labor, or the death
penalty and confiscation of property.75  For espionage, the sentence is
reform through labor for more than five years and less than ten years, with
more than ten years for a grave offense.76  Warmbier was sentenced fifteen
years for conspiracy to subvert the state,77 while Kim Dong-chul was sen-
tenced ten years for espionage and conspiracy to subvert the state.78  Ling
and Lee were sentenced twelve years total each (between five and ten years
for “aggression against the Korean nation,” or more than ten for a grave
offense) and illegal border crossing (punishment of less than five years).79
When the accused is charged with more than one crime, the Criminal
Law provides a formula that takes the heaviest penalty available and adds
half of the remaining penalties; the total combined period for reform by
74. Hahm Pyong Choon, Ideology and Criminal Law in North Korea, 17 AM. J. COMP.
L. 77, 82 (1969).
75. DPRK Criminal Law (2009), supra note 62, art. 59. R
76. Id. art. 63.
77.  http://nk.chosun.com/bbs/list.
html?table=bbs_16&idxno=7558&page=3&total=2451&sc_area=&sc_word= (Mar. 16,
2016) [https://perma.cc/RS8V-24A9].
78. Time Staff, These Three Americans Are Still Imprisoned In North Korea, TIME
(June 14, 2017), http://news.donga.com/Main/3/all/20160429/77855825/1 (April 29,
2016) [https://perma.cc/2ESA-G8T8].
79. DPRK Criminal Law (2009), supra note 62, arts. 45, 233. R
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labor may not exceed fifteen years.80  However, in the event of multiple
“extraordinarily grave” crimes or for those “not willing to be reformed,” an
unlimited term of reform through labor or capital punishment applies.81
(In the case of Kim Dong-chul, the North Korean court stated that it con-
sidered his advanced age in reducing his sentence to ten years despite the
severity of his crime.)82
The threshold for what constitutes a grave offense is not stated within
the law, and it is unclear whether the courts have an internal standard to
follow in this respect, or whether this is a subjective determination on a
case-by-case basis.  This ambiguity is also reflected in the Criminal Law
Addendum adopted in 2007, which relates to general crimes as opposed to
special crimes (of the anti-state and anti-people varieties).83  A brief law of
twenty-three articles, it provides for additional penalties for “extremely
grave” commissions of general crimes already addressed in the Criminal
Law.  The Addendum essentially negates the principle of legality provided
by the 2004 amendment of the Criminal Law because it stands as a sepa-
rate law stipulating harsher punishments such as the death penalty for
crimes deemed “extraordinarily grave.”84 Disconcertingly, there is not a
clear threshold for what is deemed a grave or extraordinarily grave
offense.85  While the Addendum itself does not affect the current deten-
tions, its existence signifies the prosecutorial and courts’ wide discretion in
deciding what rises to the level of a grave or extraordinarily grave crime
without the corresponding transparency for the public and the accused.
In terms of who stands trial for what offenses, there are inconsistent
applications depending on the type of crime committed and the nationality
of the accused.  Foreign nationals usually have a trial.  North Koreans
accused of crimes may or may not get a trial depending on the investigative
source and nature of the crime.  If the investigative source is the Ministry
of State Security or the inspection group checking on anti-socialist behav-
80. Id. arts. 45, 30.
81. Id. art. 30.
82. Tiffany Ap & Chandrika Narayan, North Korea Sentences American to 10 Years
Hard Labor, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/29/asia/north-korea-american-hard-
labor/index.html (May 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9S7B-8BHH].
83. DRPK Criminal Law (2009), supra note 62; see Han Myung Sub, Main contents R
and problems of North Korean human rights laws in REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH
KOREA 55– 56 (Korean Bar Association and International Bar Association, 2014) (dis-
cussing general crimes include vandalism of military property; plundering, stealing, or
vandalizing state property; currency counterfeiting; smuggling or trafficking of drugs,
precious metals, or national resources; possession of drugs or their raw materials; sell-
ing strategic reserve supplies; evading foreign currency; violating construction law; ille-
gally cooperating with a person living abroad; escape from prison; delinquent acts,
kidnapping, rape, stealing personal property; condoning crimes or interfering with solv-
ing a case; illegally operating a business).
84. 22.1 (2010) [Bak
Jeong-won, A Study on the Normative Control for the Security of Kim Jong-il’s Regime: with
Emphasis on the Addenda of the North Korean Criminal Law in 2007, 22 UNIFICATION
ISSUES RES, 225– 59 (2010); Han Myung Sub, supra note 83, at 54– 56. R
85. Black’s Law Dictionary explains legality as “The principle that a person may not
be prosecuted under a criminal law that has not been previously published.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (10th ed. 2014).
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ior (known as “grouppa”) and finds the suspect to have committed a politi-
cal crime, defectors claim that the prosecutorial office of the State Security
Agency can send the person to prison without a trial.86  The application of
the criminal trial procedure for non-citizens accused of anti-state or anti-
people crimes is a significant departure from this domestic standard.
These procedural considerations will be addressed in a subsequent section
on the criminal trial process with respect to international human rights
law.
Meanwhile, North Korean officials and citizens are required by law to
report any planning or commission of a crime, including those by foreign-
ers, lest they themselves be charged with failing to report or not preventing
a criminal act.87  Before 2012, the Criminal Law stipulated that those fail-
ing to report a crime or its planning were also criminally liable, but the
2012 amendment added that failing to report a crime also constituted
crimes against both the state and people, punishable by an imprisonment
term of less than three years.88  The amendment also added monetary pen-
alties as punishment categories for crimes against the state or the people,
though penalty amounts are not stipulated in the provisions themselves.89
This illustrates a tightening of surveillance among officials, citizens, and
peers; a system where not informing against others, including foreigners,
becomes an anti-state crime in itself.  This system thus pressures one to
inform against others lest he or she gets charged with an anti-state or anti-
people crime, without the guarantee of a trial.
IV. International Human Rights Law as Applied to U.S. Detainees
North Korea is obliged to abide by international human rights law in
its treatment of arrested U.S. nationals.  Specifically, North Korea is bound
by customary international human rights law90 as well as the six human
rights treaties that it has acceded to, namely the ICCPR, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography,
and, most recently in 2016, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
86. Kyu Chang Lee & Gwang Jin Chung, “The North Korean Criminal Trial System:
Characteristics and Actual Practice, KINU Research Abstract 11-05, 2.
87. Hyeongbeob [Criminal Law], Dec. 19, 1974, amended by Decree No. 2387, May
14, 2012, arts. 25 (N. Kor.)
88. DPRK Criminal Law (2009), supra note 62, arts. 25, 72. R
89. Id. arts. 27, 28.
90. According to many scholars, most if not all of the norms contained in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights have by now reached the status of customary inter-
national law. See, e.g., THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 79– 135 (Oxford University Press 1989); Louis B. Sohn, The New Inter-
national Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 17 (1982).
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Disabilities.91  North Korea had tried to withdraw from the ICCPR in 1997
but the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the ICCPR treaty body, denied this
attempt; subsequently, North Korea resumed cooperation with the Com-
mittee by submitting its state party report in 2000.92  This analysis focuses
on the ICCPR as the most relevant set of international human rights law
norms for evaluating North Korea’s actions.
Publicly disclosed in 2004 and extensively revised during 2011– 2012,
the Criminal Procedure Code consists of 438 provisions.93  The Criminal
Procedure Code states that human rights are fully guaranteed in the han-
dling of criminal cases,94 but this is understood to be in the context of the
socialist goals of the nation.  Certain procedural safeguards appear to be in
place textually, but their application is inconsistent, especially if the sub-
ject is suspected of anti-state crimes.95  The analysis below examines addi-
tional aspects of the North Korean criminal procedural laws and practices
in relation to the legal principles of the ICCPR, other international legal
instruments, and customary practices.  This section broadly analyzes
potential human rights issues that are likely to arise in cases of foreign
detainees.  These issues include whether any aspects of the arrest, investi-
gation, trial procedures, sentencing, and length and conditions of deten-
tion, respectively, violate human rights law, and whether North Korean
authorities have committed torture.
A. Arrest
The first question that arises is whether North Korea’s arrests of U.S.
nationals violate human rights law.  Where it is “clearly impossible to
invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty,” an arrest is
91. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties:
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (accessed June
14, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NEV6-QYKC]; Roberta Cohen, Human Rights in North
Korea: Addressing the Challenges, 22 INT’L J. KOREAN UNIFICATION STUD. 29, 31 (2013);
U.N. Division for Soc. Pol’y & Dev. Disability, DPR of Korea Ratifies CRPD, Total Ratifica-
tions 172, (Dec. 12, 2016); https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/news/
news/democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-ratifies-crpd-total-ratifications-172.html
[https://perma.cc/EAQ7-EGGS].  In 1997, North Korea sought to withdraw from the
ICCPR and but was informed by the Human Rights Committee that it could not do so
because the ICCPR does not contain a withdrawal provision. North Korea apparently
accepted that outcome in 2000, when it submitted its second periodic report to the
Human Rights Committee and participated in the ensuing examination. Laurence Hel-
fer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIEs 634, 639 (Duncan Hollis, ed.,
2012).
92. U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, Second Periodic Report of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea on its implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, U.S. Doc. CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2  (May 4, 2000).
93. Criminal Procedure Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2012, as
amended by Directive 2387 of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assem-
bly) (“DPRK Criminal Procedure Law”).
94. DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (2012), adopted by Directive No. 2387 by the
Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, art. 6.
95. Tae-Ung Baik, Nonjudicial Punishments of Political Offenses in North Korea –  With
a Focus on Kwanriso, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 891, 929 (2016).
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considered to be “arbitrary,” thus in violation of Article 9 of the ICCPR.96
So far, this seems a difficult argument to make in most cases of U.S. detain-
ees. Illegal entry and proselytization are prohibited under North Korean
law.  Even in the case of more political offenses— such as Merrill Newman’s
attempt to contact former Korean War guerillas or Otto Warmbier’s alleged
theft of a propaganda banner— the domestic legal basis for the arrests
seems to exist, at least arguably.  Nevertheless, in some cases it appears
that a particularly harsh criminal charge has been arbitrarily applied to
U.S. detainees, given their alleged actions.  Euna Lee and Laura Ling, for
example, were convicted of “hostility to the North Korean people” when
their actions could not reasonably be said to harm “the person or property
of North Koreans staying or visiting a foreign country,” as specified in Arti-
cle 69 of the then 2009 North Korean criminal code.97  However, their
actions may have been judged according to a broad interpretation of the
title of the provision itself: “Aggression against the Korean nation.”  As
explained earlier, North Korean authorities may read more sinister political
intent into simple offenses.
Even if there is a domestic legal basis for the arrest, however, such an
arrest would be considered arbitrary if the reasons for that arrest are incon-
sistent with international human rights law.98  This would be most prob-
lematic in cases of U.S. nationals being arrested for proselytization and
political crimes.  Article 18 of the ICCPR states, “Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to . . . manifest his religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching.”99  This Article has generally been held to
protect the right to peacefully proselytize.100  Meanwhile, Article 19 pro-
tects the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom “to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”101  This would pro-
tect the right to make critical remarks of the North Korean government.  It
is important to note that states are obliged to respect the rights of all indi-
viduals within their territory, including foreign nationals.102  Thus, if an
individual is arrested for exercising his or her freedom of religion or
speech, then that arrest and subsequent detention would violate Article 9
96. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 9(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or R
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accor-
dance with such procedure as are established by law.”).
97. KINU WHITE PAPER 2015, supra note 35, at 158– 59. R
98. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Hum. Rts., Working Group on Arbi-
trary Detention, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/WGADIndex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/X9ZL-U94M].
99. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 18(1). R
100. John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religious Freedom, Democracy, and Interna-
tional Human Rights, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583, 596 (2009) (“The ICCPR thus protects
the general right to proselytize for the sake of peaceably seeking the conversion of
another.”).
101. ICCPR supra note 19, art. 19(2). R
102. Id., art. 2(1).
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of the ICCPR.103
B. Investigation and Preliminary Examination
Article 14 of the ICCPR sets out the international legal principles gov-
erning criminal procedure, such as the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty, the ability to prepare a defense with the assistance of coun-
sel, to be tried without delay, and not to be compelled to testify against
oneself or confess guilt.104  In North Korea, once deemed suspected of a
crime, a suspect is detained for questioning during further investigation
and the preliminary examination.  The primary concern during this stage
is that the Criminal Procedure Code allows interrogation without guaran-
teeing a suspect’s right against self-incrimination.105  The Criminal Proce-
dure Code does not explicitly provide for the right to remain silent or the
presumption of innocence.  The Criminal Procedure Code provides that
examiners cannot use forceful methods to extract a confession.106  How-
ever, the interrogative culture pressures suspects to answer any and all
questions; given the intensity and length of the interrogation, this often
leading to coerced confessions and admissions of guilt.  This type of coer-
cion was disclosed in the memoirs and video clips of Laura Ling and Euna
Lee, Kenneth Bae, Otto Warmbier, and Kim Dong-chul.107  Intensive inter-
rogation methods are likely to result in duress and pressure to admit to
what the examiners want to hear in order to end the ordeal.  This raises the
question of whether harsh interrogation rises to the level of torture or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.  During the interrogation, the
assistance of counsel or any type of personal advocate is also not provided.
During the preliminary examination, a suspect cannot be detained for
more than a total of five months and twenty days, or for more than one and
a half months for “crimes punishable with labor training.”108  Once the
case is fully examined, and enough evidence is acquired, the investigator
transfers the case to the prosecutor who must decide whether to prosecute
103. Id., art. 9(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.  No one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law.”).
104. Id., arts. 14(2), 14(3).
105. Baik, supra note 95, at 896. R
106. DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (2012), supra note 93, art. 166. R
107. LAURA LING & LISA LING, SOMEWHERE INSIDE: ONE SISTER’S CAPTIVITY IN NORTH
KOREA AND THE OTHER’S FIGHT TO BRING HER HOME, 122– 28 (William Morrow 2010);
EUNA LEE & LISA DICKEY, THE WORLD IS BIGGER NOW: AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST’S RELEASE
FORM CAPTIVITY IN NORTH KOREA, 180-82 (Broadway Books 2010); Judy Kwon & Josh
Levs, Kenneth Bae Urges U.S. to Help Secure His Release in North Korea, CNN (Jan. 21,
2014, 7:06 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/20/world/asia/north-korea-kenneth-
bae/index.html; Full Press Conference with U.S. Student Otto Frederick Warmbier in
North Korea, YOUTUBE.COM (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DCZvgY1NGXU [https://perma.cc/95EA-XRBK]; Reuters, Korean American
Gets 10 Years of Hard Labor in North Korea, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2016, 10:58 AM), http:/
/www.newsweek.com/korean-american-hard-labor-north-korea-454008 [https://
perma.cc/4D25-B2QA].
108. DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (2012), supra note 93, arts. 150, 186, 187; see R
also Baik, supra note 97, at 904.
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within ten days (or three days for crimes punishable by labor training).109
However, detention can be prolonged for longer periods of time if the pros-
ecutor or judge sends a case back on grounds of insufficient evidence, thus
prolonging the examination and detention.110  Based on defector testimo-
nies, many of these procedural safeguards do not apply for those accused
of political crimes, and are otherwise inconsistently applied for other gen-
eral crimes.111
C. Trial
Considering international legal norms regarding what constitutes a
fair trial, it seems very likely that, in the case of U.S. detainees, core norms
such as the right to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal” have gone partially or totally unobserved by North
Korea.112  The structure of criminal procedure in North Korea is such that
political cases are de facto already adjudicated based on a confession of
guilt before they reach the court.  For highly charged cases, the examina-
tion phase is shortened and heightened in intensity to prosecute and sen-
tence swiftly, while other general crimes are allotted up to two months for
examination.
The North Korean court system on the whole has been consistently
found to lack independence and impartiality.  According to Freedom
House’s 2015 Report, North Korea has the lowest possible score on the rule
of law index, and “does not have an independent judiciary.”113  According
to the recent U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on the situation of
human rights in North Korea, “a lack of due process is apparent in the
entire criminal justice system of the DPRK.”114  The lack of fairness and
impartiality can also be judged by contemporary accounts of observers
who have sometimes characterized them as “sham” or “mock trials.”115
With respect to the Kenneth Bae trial, Amnesty International stated, “The
North Korean justice system makes a mockery of international fair trial
standards . . . Kenneth Bae had no access to a lawyer.  It is not even known
109. Id. arts. 262, 263; see also Baik, supra note 95, at 905. R
110. Baik, supra note 95, at 905, 907. R
111. See Chung Jae-hoon et al., Report on Human Rights in North Korea, 2014,
KOREAN BAR ASS’N  68– 69, 197 (2015), at http://www.ibanet.org/Humanright-
sNorthKoreareport.aspx [https://perma.cc/THA4-SBRG].
112. ICCPR, supra note 19, art 14(1). R
113. North Korea, FREEDOM House (2015), https://freedomhouse.org/report/free-
dom-world/2015/north-korea [https://perma.cc/E8WL-5JC3].
114. COI report, supra note 23, at 209, para. 696. R
115. For example, Andrei Lankov characterizes trials of foreigners as “mock trials.”
Andrei Lankov, Why, Despite Recent Arrests, there are Few Risks in Traveling to North
Korea, NK NEWS (July 21, 2014), https://www.nknews.org/2014/07/why-despite-recent-
arrests-there-are-few-risks-in-traveling-to-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/P3QW-8P5V].
According to Reporters Without Borders, Euna Lee and Laura Ling were convicted in
“sham trials of an unspecified ‘grave crime’”. American Reporters get ‘Very Severe’ 12-
Year Sentences Designed to Scare all Foreign Journalists, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (June
8, 2009), https://rsf.org/en/news/american-reporters-get-very-severe-12-year-sentences-
designed-scare-all-foreign-journalists [https://perma.cc/S2HR-6FJR].
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what he was charged with.”116  According to Human Rights Watch, the
Aijalon Gomes trial looked like a “North Korean charade, with a vague
criminal charge and a lack of due process leading to a long prison sen-
tence.”117  However, these accounts may speak more to the lack of informa-
tion about the North Korean process since Bae was offered the services of a
lawyer.118  Ling and Lee were also offered counsel assistance though only
Ling agreed to it.119  However, it should be noted that the utility of defense
counsel is highly questionable in crimes against the state.  While the Crim-
inal Procedure Code provides the right to counsel for trial,120 the defense
counsel’s presence is often found not to be helpful for rigorous advocacy
on behalf of the defendant as found among surveyed North Koreans now
residing in South Korea.121
It is also important to contextualize these trial procedures within the
framework of national security.  Due process considerations are often sac-
rificed in the name of national security when detainees or defendants are
viewed as enemies of the state, much like North Korean spies have been
detained without trial or public knowledge in South Korea, or terror sus-
pects in Guantanamo who were not afforded due process at first (e.g.
access to counsel, habeas corpus) and have been continuously denied
access to the courts while under indefinite detention.  Investigation and
prosecution of anti-state crimes in North Korea often do not offer the full
protection of law, especially if the Ministry of State Security is in charge of
the investigation and preliminary examination, as would most likely have
been the case for most, if not all, of the U.S. detainees.
D. Sentencing and Punishment
The severity of any punishment must not be disproportionate to the
crime committed.  Several of the U.S. detainees have been sentenced to
long periods of “hard labor” as punishment.122  For example, Otto
116. North Korea Sentences U.S. Citizen to 15 Years Hard Labor, AMNESTY INT’L (May 2,
2013), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/asia/north-korea-sentences-u-s-citizen-to-15-years-
hard-labor/#more-34498 [https://perma.cc/4W8Y-Q57X].
117. North Korea: Verdict on American Raises Fair Trial Concerns, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Apr. 8, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/08/north-korea-verdict-
american-raises-fair-trial-concerns [https://perma.cc/7EPX-SCYD].
118. See North Korea Makes Its Case against Kenneth Bae, THE GUARDIAN (May 10,
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/10/north-korea-case-kenneth-
bae [https://perma.cc/BF7V-S5C2].
119. Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Says Journalists Admitted Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (June
16, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/asia/17confess.html [https://
perma.cc/A4XP-QLE3].
120. DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (2012), art. 58, art. 275.
121. See Chung et. al., supra note 111, at 70– 71, 73– 74. R
122. James Pearson, Kenneth Bae Sentenced to 15 years Hard Labor, NK NEWS (May 2,
2013), https://www.nknews.org/2013/05/kenneth-bae-sentenced-to-15-years-hard-
labor-in-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/UH7J-XFWY]. For Bae, this involved farming
for eight hours per day. Chad O’Carroll, North Korea Releases Kenneth Bae Prison Inter-
view via CNN, NK NEWS (July 3, 2013), https://www.nknews.org/2013/07/north-korea-
releases-kenneth-bae-prison-interview-via-cnn/ [https://perma.cc/386X-TELA]; Nate
Thayer, Matthew Miller’s Excellent Adventure in North Korea, NK NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014),
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN105.txt unknown Seq: 20 27-AUG-18 14:53
166 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
Warmbier received a sentence of fifteen years for attempting to steal a prop-
aganda banner, a punishment that Human Rights Watch condemned as an
“outrageous and shocking” response to a college-style prank.123  North
Korean citizens must revere portraits, images, and representations of their
leaders’ visage and moniker in the manner of le`se-majeste´ laws.  Thus, local
authorities would consider any defacement or attempted theft of state
property to be justification for harsh punishment.  Nonetheless, while the
use of hard labor is explicitly allowed by Article 8(3) of the ICCPR, one can
nevertheless argue that the duration and nature of this punishment is so
disproportionate to the crimes allegedly committed as to qualify as cruel
and inhumane, in violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR.
Furthermore, U.S. detainees have generally been tried directly by the
North Korean Supreme Court, meaning that they have no right to appeal,
in violation of Article 14(5) of the ICCPR, which states, “Everyone con-
victed of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being
reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.”124  This means that the
sentencing of U.S. citizens would be final without further domestic judicial
remedy, and thus forces a diplomatic solution in most cases.
E. Detention
According to the ICCPR, “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.”125  It is quite clear that North Korea regularly violates this
provision— to an extreme degree— with respect to its own prisoners.
According to the UN COI report, ordinary North Korean prisoners are sub-
jected to “solitary confinement in tiny cells, the deliberate imposition of
extreme levels of starvation as a disciplinary measure, and the infliction of
severe beatings and other atrocities.”126  Political prison camps are even
worse, and according to Human Rights Watch are “characterized by system-
atic abuses and often deadly conditions.”127
North Korea has tended to give U.S. nationals conditions of detention
far superior to those that its own citizens suffer under.128  Several detain-
https://www.nknews.org/2014/11/matthew-millers-excellent-adventure-in-north-korea/
(describing his labor as involving moving stones and removing weeds) [https://
perma.cc/TYA4-6WSC].
123. Choe & Gladstone, supra note 3 (quoting Phil Robertson, Deputy Asia director R
for Human Rights Watch).
124. KINU WHITE PAPER 2015, supra note 40, at 146. R
125. ICCPR, supra note 19, art 10. R
126. COI report, supra note 23, at 331, para. 1076. Political prisoners are subject to R
even worse conditions. See COI Report, at paras. 729– 81.
127. World Report 2015: North Korea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2015), https://
www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/north-korea (“[Deadly conditions at
the camps include] meager rations that lead to near-starvation, virtually no medical
care, lack of proper housing and clothes, regular mistreatment including sexual assault
and torture by guards, and executions.”) [https://perma.cc/X7HK-XFDL].
128. John Hudson, What’s It Like to Do ‘Hard Labor’ in North Korea, FOREIGN POL’Y:
PASSPORT (May 2, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/02/whats-it-like-to-do-hard-
labor-in-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/P4WH-YU6W].  Matthew Miller stated that he
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ees have stayed at a Pyongyang guest house rather than one of the notori-
ous prison camps and report that they were treated reasonably and
humanely.129  Detainees have generally been given their own room, consis-
tent with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.130
However, most have been isolated in detention, usually kept alone without
other prisoners.  For example, Ling and Lee were separated and had guards
staying in adjacent rooms.131  Bae was kept isolated in a compound with
only guards as his company.132
Whether North Korea’s use of solitary confinement for U.S. detainees
violates international human rights law would depend on the facts of each
case.133  According to the Human Rights Committee, solitary confinement
is “justifiable only in case of urgent need,”134 and its use may constitute
inhumane punishment, in violation of Article 7 and Article 10 of the
ICCPR.135  Whether a particular use of solitary confinement in fact vio-
lates Article 7 of the ICCPR depends on the circumstances of the case.
While the Human Rights Committee has found a one-year term of solitary
confinement to be in violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR,136 a ten-day soli-
was “prepared for the ‘torture’ but instead of that I was killed with kindness”.  Nate
Thayer, Matthew Miller’s Excellent Adventure in North Korea, NK NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://www.nknews.org/2014/11/matthew-millers-excellent-adventure-in-north-korea/
[https://perma.cc/2B8F-2RSZ]; Jeffery Fowle stated that the “North Koreans treated him
reasonably well.”  Jon Kamp & Scott Calvert, Former Detainees in North Korea Recount
Pattern of Despair, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-de
tainees-in-north-korea-recount-pattern-of-despair-1454702338 [https://perma.cc/PN3H-
97JW].
129. “Lee and Ling were held in isolation in a guest house in Pyongyang, as was Evan
Hunziger.”  Andrew Salmon, N. Korea: American Sentenced to 8 Years, CNN (Apr. 7,
2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/04/07/north.korea.ameri
can.sentenced [https://perma.cc/7UTE-ZW59]; Tim Dodson, What does Detainment in
North Korea Actually Mean?, CAVALIER DAILY (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.cavalierdaily.
com/article/2016/03/what-does-detainment-in-north-korea-actually-mean (quoting
Fowle as stating he was “treated reasonably well . . . [n]ever physically abused, [and
given] three meals a day”) [https://perma.cc/B2TT-CHNM].
130. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 38 (“each R
prisoner shall occupy by night a cell or room by himself”).
131. Hudson, supra note 128. R
132. Tamara Khandaker, American Detained in North Korea Had 30 Guards to Himself
—  And They All Wanted to Know about the US, VICE NEWS (May 25, 2016), https://
news.vice.com/article/man-detained-in-north-korea-had-30-guards-to-himself-and-they-
all-wanted-to-know-about-america [https://perma.cc/2MPX-RPL4].
133. Hamish Macdonald, Matthew Miller begins sentence, describes conditions NK
NEWS (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.nknews.org/2014/09/matthew-miller-begins-sen
tence-describes-conditions/ (quoting Miller as stating “it’s isolation, no contact with
anyone”) [https://perma.cc/QX3H-TD3Z].
134. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Denmark, UN Doc.
CCPR/CO/70/DNK §12 (Nov. 15, 2000).
135. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition
of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Gen. Com-
ment No. 20 §6 (Mar. 10, 1992); HRC regarding Denmark, “use of solitary confinement
other than in exceptional circumstances and for limited periods is inconsistent with
article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.” Human Rights Committee CCPR/CO/70/
DNK, supra note 134. R
136. Polay Campos v Peru, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 577/1994, UN
Doc. CCPR/C?61/D/577/1994, §8.6 (Nov. 6, 1997).
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tary confinement was not deemed to be a violation.137  Besides duration,
other factors that may play a role in assessing the legitimacy of solitary
confinement include the stringency of the measure, the objective pursued,
and the effects on the detainee.138  Considering that the alternative to soli-
tary confinement would mean spending time in a regular prison, the argu-
ment against solitary conditions may be a difficult one to make in the case
of short detentions.  However, solitary confinement for lengthier sentences
would likely amount to human rights violations.
F. Torture
Another significant human rights question that arises is whether
North Korea’s actions violate the international law prohibition on torture,
which is contained in Article 7 of the ICCPR,139 as well as the Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (CAT), which North Korea has not ratified.140  Under CAT, inflicting
“severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental . . . intentionally” to
extract a confession, punish, or intimidate is considered torture and thus a
violation of international human rights law.141  The prohibition against
torture is also a widely accepted norm of customary international law that
is also found in the Geneva Conventions and, most would agree, a jus cogens
prohibition.142  Thus, despite not having ratified CAT, any act of torture by
North Korean officials would be a clear breach of one of the most impor-
tant legal restrictions in international human rights law.
In fact, there are many credible reports of North Korean officials tor-
turing their own citizens, and it is a common feature of their political and
non-political prison system despite the Criminal Procedure Code prohibit-
ing the use of force to gain a confession.143  With respect to U.S. nationals,
there has been far less evidence of torture, except for the cases of the fol-
lowing detainees.  For example, the possibility of torture had been brought
up with respect to Robert Park, Aijalon Gomes, and Kim Dong Shik (who
137. Vuolanne v. Finland, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 265/1987, §9.2
(April 7, 1989).
138. Dhoest v. Belgium, App. No. 10448/83, Eur. H.R. Rep. §§ 117– 118 (1987);
McFeeley et al. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8317/78, Eur. H.R. Rep. 44, 82 (1980).
139. International Covenant on Civil and Political Right art. 7, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
140. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1965 U.N.T.S. 112.
141. Id. art. 1.
142. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal),
Judgment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, para. 99 (“the prohibition of torture is part
of customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens)”)
Questions Relation to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 144, ¶ 99 (July 20) (“the prohibition of torture is part of
customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens)”).
143. See COI Report, supra note 18, at para. 707 (“Torture is an established feature of R
the interrogation process”); id. at 1076 (“Torture, as defined under international crimi-
nal law, is an established feature of the ordinary prisons in the DPRK.”); Human Rights
Watch, supra note 127 (“People arrested in North Korea are routinely tortured by offi- R
cials in the course of interrogations”).
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was a U.S. permanent resident rather than a citizen).144  Robert Park
alleged in a Yonhap News report that, while detained, he was beaten with
his hands tied behind his back and later had his genitals beaten and
laughed at by female North Korean officials, leading to serious physical
and psychological trauma.145  While Park brought details of this initial
report into question,146 he later reiterated the allegation of North Korean
torture.147  There were also press reports of Gomes being tortured,
although when asked directly he declined to comment due to a stated
respect for President Carter’s desire to maintain friendly relations with
North Korea.148  Both Park and Gomes reportedly attempted suicide dur-
ing or soon after their detention.149  Finally, a number of North Korea
experts reported that they had heard that Kim Dong Shik died as a result of
his torture by North Korean authorities after his abduction from China,
although they had no first-hand knowledge of his fate.150
Warmbier’s comatose state also presents a dramatically different story
from most of the U.S. detainees’ experiences. Initial news media reported
that upon return to the United States, physicians found him to be in “a
state of unresponsive wakefulness” which was most likely due to cardi-
opulmonary arrest and that he had no signs of physical trauma to cause
144. Bryan Kay, Robert Park Speaks Out, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 16, 2012), https://
thediplomat.com/2012/02/robert-park-speaks-out/ [https://perma.cc/KR8G-EE9H];
Choe Sang-Hun, After 15 Years, Legal Victory for Family of Pastor Believed Abducted by
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/world/
asia/after-15-years-victory-of-sorts-for-family-of-pastor-believed-abducted-by-north-
korea.html [https://perma.cc/TS84-3HKL]; Choe Sang-Hun, Austin Ramzy & Motoko
Rich, Otto Warmbier Got an Extra Dose of Brutality From North Korea. The Mystery is
Why, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/asia/
north-korea-otto-warmbier-.html [https://perma.cc/4PD2-UV9A]. Dating back to an ear-
lier era, there is also considerable evidence of North Korea torture of U.S. sailors cap-
tured on the USS Pueblo in 1968. Zach Lowe, Barnes & Thornburg Helps Tortured Sailors
of USS Pueblo 40 Years Later, AMLAW DAILY (Dec. 31, 2008, 2:36 PM), http://amlaw
daily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/12/barnes-thornburg-helps-tortured-sailors-of-
uss-pueblo-40-years-later.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ8P-6STC].
145. Kim Kwang-tae, Korean-American Missionary to Sue N. Korea for Sexual Torture,
YONHAP NEWS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/02/08/
58/0301000000AEN20120208006600315F.HTML [https://perma.cc/D9MV-Z2H4].
146. Kay, supra note 144. R
147. Sang-Hun, Ramzy & Rich, supra note 144. R
148. Associated Press, Former President Jimmy Carter Secures Release of American
Aijalon Gomes from North Korea Jail, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2010, 10:50 PM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/world/president-jimmy-carter-secures-release-american-
aijalon-gomes-north-korea-jail-article-1.204589 [https://perma.cc/D67P-UXYC].
149. Ravi Somaiya, American Prisoner Attempts Suicide in North Korean Gulag,
NEWSWEEK (July 8, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/american-prisoner-attempts-sui-
cide-north-korean-gulag-74557 [https://perma.cc/BSS8-6CJ7]; Mark McDonald, Activist
Tells of Torture in North Korea Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/10/28/world/asia/28seoul.html [https://perma.cc/QE22-G5HB]; Lyndsay
Winkley & Teri Figueroa, Prisoner Free from North Korea with Help of President Carter
Found Burned to Death, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:50 PM), http://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/sd-me-fire-death-20171121-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6L5M-ETGC].
150. Andrew Wolmam & Andrea Lazarow, Han Kim and North Korean Accountability
for Torture and Unlawful Killing, 10 J.E. ASIAN & INT’L. L. 273, 275– 76 (2017).
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the coma.151  His parents said that when they first met him on the plane,
he was howling, “jerking violently,” that he had unseeing eyes and could
not hear them, that his bottom teeth looked like they had been rearranged,
and that he had a large scar on his foot.152  However, the coroner later
announced that the evidence for torture was inconclusive: there was no
trauma to his teeth; and his symptoms upon arrival in the United States
were a result of the brain damage for which he had received “round the
clock” care.153  It was also noted that he was in “surprisingly good condi-
tion” for having been bedridden over a year.154
It may be difficult to believe Warmbier’s condition could have reached
this state without wrongdoing on the part of North Korean authorities in
terms of outright cruel acts, extreme medical neglect or negligence, or a
combination of the two.  The U.S. physicians explained that his body was
well nourished and he did not have scars other than what might have been
needed for medical necessity.155  While he may have received decent medi-
cal care after the cardiopulmonary arrest, the specific events triggering it
are unknown.  If North Korean officials had purposefully inflicted severe
pain and suffering, physical or mental, on Warmbier during his time in
detention, this would be a violation of the jus cogens prohibition against
torture, as found in the ICCPR, CAT, and various other treaties and cus-
tomary law sources. Most likely, any torture investigation would focus on
the circumstances leading to Warmbier’s cardiopulmonary arrest within
the first month of detention after his trial.  This also raises the issue of
whether certain acts can rise to the level of torture, such as constant
threats, use of force, solitary confinement, medical negligence or neglect in
cases of illness, or combinations thereof.  Without further facts, it is diffi-
cult to determine conclusively whether intentional infliction of pain and
suffering occurred, but the North Korean government should nonetheless
bear responsibility for Warmbier’s final state.
151. WCPO, Doctors Update Public On Otto Warmbier’s Death, YOUTUBE (June 15,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJKmyCKM7W0 [https://perma.cc/RP7S-
BTVJ].
152. Otto Warmbier’s Parents Open Up About Son’s Death, FOX NEWS (Sept.26, 2017),
http://video.foxnews.com/v/5588887953001/?#sp=show-clips [https://perma.cc/
U3T2-GVG3].
153. Julia Jacobo, Coroner: Evidence Inconclusive on Otto Warmbier being Tortured in
North Korea, ABC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/US/evidence-inconclu
sive-otto-warmbier-tortured-north-korea-coroner/story?id=50135211 [https://perma.cc/
J5EM-5GPE].
154. Dan Sewell, Cause of Otto Warmbier’s Death After North Korea Detention May
Never Be Known, NBC SAN DIEGO (Sept. 28, 2017, 7:15 AM), https://
www.nbcsandiego.com/news/national-international/Coroners-report-sheds-little-light-
on-Otto-Warmbiers-death-448261243.html?D [https://perma.cc/M4TD-45RW].
155. WCPO, supra note 151.  They had received two scans on a CD of his brain from R
North Korea, dated April 2016 and July 2016, showing the evolution of neurological
damage and that his symptoms developed consistent with those images. Id.
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V. International and Domestic Legal Recourse
Given that North Korean actions toward U.S. detainees likely violate
international human rights law, the next question is whether the individual
detainee, his or her family, or the United States as a nation has any
recourse for such violations.  This section will discuss several potential
options, although none of these options is likely to be particularly satisfac-
tory to either the detainee or the U.S. government.  Dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms tend to be weak in international law, and even
more so in the area of international human rights law.  Nevertheless, pos-
sibilities for recourse do exist, including individual complaint mechanisms
at the international level, individual actions under U.S. domestic law, and
state action by the U.S. government.  Each of these will be discussed in
turn. North Korean domestic law provides another theoretical way for
detainees to assert their rights, but this possibility will not be discussed
here, as it is not a realistic option.156
A. Travel Restrictions
Until Warmbier’s death, U.S. citizens had been free to travel to North
Korea unrestricted, although the Department of State had issued its
sternest travel advisory after the sentencing of Warmbier and Kim Dong-
chul, exhorting:
U.S. citizens to avoid all travel to North Korea due to the serious risk of
arrest and long-term detention under North Korea’s system of law enforce-
ment, which imposes unduly harsh sentences, including for actions that in
the United States would not be considered crimes and which threaten U.S.
citizen detainees with being treated in accordance with wartime law of the
DPRK.157
After Warmbier’s death, the State Department placed restrictions so that
U.S. passports would not be effective for travel to North Korea as of Sep-
tember 1, 2017 in order to prevent further detentions of U.S. citizens and to
withdraw revenue sources for North Korea.158  Exceptions for special, one-
time visits may be made if an applicant demonstrates that the trip is in the
national interest by qualifying as either a professional journalist or a Red
Cross representative, or showing “compelling humanitarian considera-
156. The North Korean courts are heavily politicized and cannot be expected to rule
that the government has violated international (or indeed domestic) law.  Also, barriers
of sovereign immunity and the detainees’ presumed lack of desire or ability to return to
North Korea after obtaining their freedom mean that North Korean domestic recourse
would be essentially inconceivable.
157. U.S. Dep’t ‘ Bureau of Consular Aff., International Travel, Country Information,
North Korea, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Jan. 10, 2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/pass-
ports/en/alertswarnings/north-korea-travel-warning.html [https://perma.cc/2KEY-
4V6P].
158. Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. Bans Travel to North Korea from September 1, Says Ameri-
cans Should Leave, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
northkorea-usa-travel/u-s-bans-travel-to-north-korea-from-september-1-says-americans-
should-leave-idUSKBN1AI2H5 [https://perma.cc/FVD4-VF32].
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tions” or “otherwise in the national interest.”159  Those U.S. citizens who
violate the travel ban will have their passports revoked and may be subject
to felony prosecution.160
Meanwhile, House representatives have introduced a bill to enact the
North Korea Travel Control Act that would require the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to issue regulations prohibiting travel-related transactions with North
Korea unless granted a Treasury license, essentially curtailing U.S. citizen
participation in tours to North Korea.161  Although not explicitly con-
nected to the detainee issue, the U.S. has also complicated travel to North
Korea by placing Air Koryo (Korea’s state-owned airline) on the Office of
Foreign Assets Control sanctions list.162
Despite these restrictions, some U.S. citizens will no doubt continue to
visit North Korea, so detentions may not be entirely remediated by the
travel ban.  The ban may also have certain negative consequences; some
argue that allowing travel to North Korea is beneficial, as a way of exposing
North Korean citizens to information from the outside world and humaniz-
ing Americans, who would otherwise be seen only through the lens of state
propaganda.163
B. Individual Complaint Mechanisms at the International Level
One way that a detainee may choose to address human rights viola-
tions connected to his or her detention is by filing a complaint in an inter-
national forum.  In many parts of the world, the most plausible starting
point would be to file a complaint through a regional human rights mecha-
nism; however, this is not an option for North Korean detainees because
Northeast Asia is one of the few regions that lack either a regional or sub-
regional human rights mechanism of any kind.  A complaint to the Human
Rights Committee would also be off the table; although North Korea has
ratified the ICCPR, they have not accepted ICCPR Optional Protocol 1,
which authorizes individual complaints.164
One possibility would be for a detainee to file a complaint to one of
the UN Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights, such as the Special Rap-
porteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s
159. 22 C.F.R. § 51.64 (2018).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2018); 22 C.F.R. §51.64 (2018); U.S. Dep’t of St. Bureau of
Consular Aff., International Travel News, North Korea Travel Restriction,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Aug. 2, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/inter-
national-travel-news/dprk-travel-restriction.html [https://perma.cc/P8ZM-SV6Y].
161. H.R. 2732, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).
162. Chad O’Carroll, Restrict U.S. Travel to N. Korea: Expert Recommendation to Con-
gress, NK NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nknews.org/2017/02/restrict-u-s-travel-to-
n-korea-expert-recommendation-to-congress/ [https://perma.cc/JL59-F8KL].
163. Chad O’Carroll, Tourism in North Korea: Right or Wrong? Defectors make their
Case, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/
01/tourism-north-korea-right-wrong-ethical-defectors [https://perma.cc/C5J3-LHSN].
164. The U.S. has also refrained from ratifying ICCPR Optional Protocol 1. See Office
of the U.N. High Comm’r of Human Rights, Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (Jan. 24, 2018), http://indicators.ohchr.org/ [https://
perma.cc/KLW2-YXRC].
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Republic of Korea (DPRK Special Rapporteur), currently Argentinian law-
yer Toma`s Ojea Quintana, or the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan Me´ndez (also
an Argentinian lawyer).165  Special Rapporteurs are able to receive commu-
nications from the public; however, they do not issue decisions on a partic-
ular complaint’s validity.  Rather, they can contact the government involved
to help work towards resolving the complaint, or to remind the government
of its obligations.  In the North Korean case, however, such interventions
are unlikely to be helpful, as the North Korean government has refused to
engage with DPRK Special Rapporteur and has regularly attempted to
delegitimize the Rapporteur’s work.166
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) is a third possi-
ble venue for a detention complaint.  WGAD is a five-person committee of
experts established in 1991 by the Human Rights Commission.167  It
receives and evaluates complaints from around the world that allege arbi-
trary detention.  WGAD considers detention to be arbitrary in three differ-
ent circumstances: (1) when it is “clearly impossible to invoke any legal
basis justifying the deprivation of liberty;” (2) when the detention “results
from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14,
18, 19, 10 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, inso-
far as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26
and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;” and
(3) when the non-observance of fair trial rights “is of such gravity as to give
the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character.”168  The WGAD con-
demned the North Korean government on several occasions for its treat-
ment of its own citizens.169  The North Korean government, however, is not
legally required to comply with Working Group rulings, and in fact has
165. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. High Comm’r of Human Rights, Special Rapporteur
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Torture/SRTorture/Pages/SRTortureIndex.aspx [https://
perma.cc/R3ZM-YU6V].
166. See, e.g., Louis Charbonneau, North Korea Says U.N. Rights Talk Is Political Plot,
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-korea-north-un/north-
korea-says-u-n-rights-talk-is-political-plot-idUKTRE69L5S620101022 [https://perma.cc/
LR89-TWE5].
167. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r of Human Rights, Working Group on Arbi-
trary Detention, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/WGADIndex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/L4DM-TT8Z].
168. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r Of Human Rights, Individual Complaints
and Urgent Appeals, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/Com-
plaints.aspx [https://perma.cc/6GTS-R36S].
169. See Working Group on Arbitrary Det., Ops. Adopted by the Working Group on
Arbitrary Det. at Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/36 (Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea), at 6– 7 (Apr. 4, 2014); Working Group on Arbitrary
Det., Ops. Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Det. at Its Sixty-Eighth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/34 (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), at 5– 7
(Apr. 4, 2014); Working Group on Arbitrary Det., Ops. Adopted by the Working Group
on Arbitrary Det. at Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/35 (Dem-
ocratic People’s Republic of Korea), at 8 (Jan. 15, 2014). The Working Group also heard
a case involving alleged North Korean abduction of South Korean citizens, but was not
able to reach a conclusion regarding the credibility of the allegations. See Working
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dismissed these cases as part of a political plot against North Korea by the
South Korean regime.170
The Human Rights Council would be one final plausible venue for an
individual complaint.  Pursuant to Resolution 5/1 (2007), the Council can
hear communications from individuals who “claim to be victims of human
rights violations or that have direct, reliable knowledge of such viola-
tions.”171  As with the other UN human rights mechanisms, though, any
conclusions made by the Council would not be binding, and (unlike the
WGAD) would be conveyed confidentially to the state concerned.  In the
case of North Korean detainees, however, there would likely be admissibil-
ity difficulties for any complaint, because cases are not allowed if the
underlying violations are “already being dealt with by a special procedure,
a treaty body or other United Nations or similar regional complaints proce-
dure in the field of human rights.”172  In this case, the DPRK Special Rap-
porteur is already mandated to address North Korean human rights abuses.
While all of these possible venues would allow a detainee to at least
highlight their treatment at the international level, it is important to stress
that the chances of a former detainee receiving a satisfying resolution are
very limited.  These venues are not courts, so any judgments offered would
not be considered binding under international law, and, in fact, North
Korea would be very unlikely to comply with any recommendations.
Meanwhile, these mechanisms may be used to bring attention to current
detainees, for example, through petitions by the National Human Rights
Commission of Korea to the DPRK Special Rapporteur, WGAD, and the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to address the
arrest and detention of three South Korean pastors charged with espionage
as well as the capture of several North Korean defectors who had become
South Korean nationals.173
C. U.S. Private Law Remedies
Another option worth examining is the filing of civil suits against
North Korea in U.S. courts.  Claims against foreign governments are gener-
ally not allowed because of the principle of sovereign immunity, as imple-
mented in the U.S. by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).174
However, FSIA exempts suits against foreign sponsors of terrorism for hos-
tage-taking (as defined in the Hostages Convention), torture (as defined in
Group on Arbitrary Det. Decision No. 29/1995 (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea),
¶ ¶ 5, 8 (Sept. 13, 1995).
170. See Working Group on Arbitrary Det., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/36, supra
note 169, at ¶ 20. R
171. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r of Human Rights, Human Rights Council Com-
plaint Procedure, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ComplaintProcedure/
Pages/HRCComplaintProcedureIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/VK2K-JPTB].
172. Id.
173. S. Korea to Ask U.N. to Look into Fate of Detainees in N.K, YONHAP NEWS (Sept.
12, 2017), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/09/12/0200000000AEN2017
0912005300315.html [https://perma.cc/U8C8-CH7U].
174. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
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the Torture Victims Protection Act), and extrajudicial killings.175  In the
past, this has proven to be a feasible way to receive a judgment for damages
(even if collecting on that judgment has been impossible) in two detainee
cases: Massie v. Government of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea176 and
Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.177
Massie involved a lawsuit from survivors and family members of the
Pueblo incident, the 1968 capture by North Korea of the spy submarine
USS Pueblo and the subsequent eleven-month imprisonment (and torture)
of eighty-two of its crew-members.178  North Korea was found guilty of
both hostage-taking in violation of Article 1 of the Hostages Convention
and torture in violation of Section 3 of the Torture Victims Protection
Act.179  The plaintiffs were awarded $10,000 per day for pain and suffering
during their captivity, as well as a total of $46,400,000 for pain and suffer-
ing endured after their release.180
In the Han Kim case, the family of Kim Dong Shik sued the North
Korean government, alleging that it had abducted him, confined him in a
political prisoner camp, and eventually tortured and killed him.181  The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the appellants’
claim, because it found no first-hand evidence of torture.182  However, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on appeal, holding that even absent
direct evidence, the court should find a default judgment in favor of the
plaintiff where there is compelling and admissible evidence that the
“regime abducted the victim and that it routinely tortures and kills the peo-
ple it abducts,” as is the case in North Korea.183  Interestingly, the ade-
quacy of circumstantial evidence in cases involving disappearances was
justified in part by Congress’s purpose of holding state sponsors of terror-
ism responsible for their crimes, and also in part by reference to the disap-
pearance-related jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.184  On remand, the D.C. District Court awarded each plaintiff $15
175. See id. §1605A(a). The TVPA defines torture as “any act, directed against an
individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffer-
ing . . . is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from
that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual
. . . intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.” See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1992).
176. Massie v. Gov’t of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 592 F. Supp. 2d 57,
73– 77 (D.D.C. 2008). The FSIA was also successfully employed.
177. Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 950 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C.
2013), rev’d, 774 F.3d 1044, 1050– 51 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
178. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. at 60– 61.
179. Id. at 74.
180. Id. at 77.
181. Han Kim, supra note 177, at 1045. R
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1049.
184. Id. at 361 (citing Radilla– Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Rep-
arations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter– Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 209, ¶ 222 (Nov. 23,
2009) and Vela´squez– Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter– Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser.C) No. 4, ¶ 131 (July 29, 1988)).
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million and assessed $300 million of punitive damages against North
Korea.185
Unfortunately for more recent detainees, the FSIA temporarily ceased
to be a viable option between 2008 and 2017, because North Korea was
removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism during this period,
after being on the list for twenty years.186  Starting in 2016, however, legis-
lative pressure to reinstate North Korea as a terrorist state emerged.187  In
May 2016, Ted Poe (R) introduced a bill requesting the State Department to
report to Congress within ninety days on whether a list of North Korean
acts constitute support for international terrorism.188  This was enacted
nearly a year later as the North Korea State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation
Act of 2017, asking for the State Department’s appraisal.189  In September
2017, the Warmbier family spoke out to urge North Korea’s relisting.190
Finally, on November 17, 2017, the State Department reinstated North
Korea as a state sponsor of terror.191  In his speech announcing this devel-
opment, President Trump cited the country’s threats of nuclear destruction
and involvement in assassinations on foreign soil and remembered Otto
Warmbier.192
185. Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 87 F. Supp. 3d 286, 291 (D.D.C.
2015). The plaintiffs in this case (as in Massie) have not actually received compensation
from North Korea, although the plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to search for accessible
funds.  Recently, they filed suit in Mexico, in an attempt to seize a North Korean ship
located there in order to help satisfy the judgment, but this attempt proved unsuccessful.
Andrew Wolman & Andrea Lazarow, Han Kim and North Korean Accountability for Tor-
ture and Unlawful Killing, 10 J.E. ASIAN & INT’L. L. 273, 278 (2017).
186. The removal was effected as part of (eventually unsuccessful) disarmament
negotiations underway at the time. North Korea was listed by the U.S. as a state sponsor
of terrorism in 1988.  Public Notice 53 Fed. Reg. 3325 (Feb. 5, 1988); AP, U.S.
Lawmakers Push to have North Korea Reinstated on List of State Sponsors of Terrorism,
JAPANESE TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/17/asia-
pacific/u-s-lawmakers-push-north-korea-reinstated-list-state-sponsors-terrorism/ [https:/
/perma.cc/CZR5-4S45].
187. AP, U.S. Lawmakers Push to have North Korea Reinstated on List of State Sponsors
of Terrorism, JAPAN TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/
17/asia-pacific/u-s-lawmakers-push-north-korea-reinstated-list-state-sponsors-terrorism/
[https://perma.cc/4UHH-T6NL].
188. This list includes assassinations of dissidents and weapons sales to militant
groups, H.R. 5208, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2016).
189. North Korea State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Act of 2017, H.R. 479,
115th Cong.(2017).
190. Marc Thiessen, The Warmbiers are Right: North Korea should be back on the State
Sponsors of Terror List, FOX NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2017/09/28/marc-thiessen-warmbiers-are-right-north-korea-should-be-back-on-state-
sponsors-terror-list.html [https://perma.cc/SLH9-4XVS].
191. Department of State, Public Notice 10211: Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), 82 Fed. Reg. 56,100
(Nov. 27, 2017).
192. Jeff Mason & David Brunnstrom, Trump Declares North Korea State Sponsor of
Terrorism, Triggers Sanctions, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-northkorea-missiles-usa/trump-declares-north-korea-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-
triggers-sanctions-idUSKBN1DK223 [https://perma.cc/KP6F-43F7]. The assassination
allusion presumably refers to the murder of Kim Jong Nam by VX nerve agent at the
Kuala Lumpur airport in February 2017. See, generally, Joshua Berlinger, Kim Jong Nam:
The Plot to Murder North Korea’s Exiled Son, CNN (Sept. 26, 2017), https://edition
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Now that North Korea is once again on the list of state sponsors of
terrorism, current and future detainees will have a more plausible path to
justice.  In particular, they may be able to claim that North Korea has spon-
sored their hostage-taking.  This would be a factual question that is diffi-
cult to prove, but certainly many commentators have characterized U.S.
detainees in North Korea as “bargaining chips” to be cashed in by the
North Korean government in exchange for official or semi-official visits by
U.S. officials, or perhaps other inducements.193  This has also been the
feeling of at least some of the detainees themselves.  Kenneth Bae, for exam-
ple, wrote that he concluded based on his interactions with guards that he
was being used as a bargaining chip.194  In fact, the use of detainees as
“bargaining chips” has been explicitly condemned by the Israeli Supreme
Court as hostage-taking under Article 1 of the Hostages Convention.195
Although North Korea has at times openly connected detainee treatment
with geopolitical issues,196 on other occasions it has officially denied that
the detainees are being held as bargaining chips, and may or may not have
covertly made explicit demands of the U.S. in exchange for their release.197
However, the existence of explicit demands is not determinative.  Accord-
ing to U.S. case law, it is not necessary for the hostage-takers demands to
.cnn.com/2017/07/26/asia/kim-jong-nam-killing/index.html [https://perma.cc/G3UZ-
E9A9].
193. Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Expected to Indict American it is Holding, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/world/asia/north-korea-
expected-to-charge-american.html (“North Korea, a police state, has often used the plight
of detained Americans as a bargaining chip in its dealings with Washington”) [https://
perma.cc/6XWP-TERG]; Kang Tae-ho, U.S. Asking N. Korea to Release American Citizen,
HANKYOREH (May 1, 2013), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/
585413.html (noting that US detainees such as had been used as Euna Lee, Laura Ling,
and Anjali Gomes had been used by the North Koreans to induce U.S. officials to visit
for talks) [https://perma.cc/GZC6-P4NK]; SANGSOO LEE, INST. SEC. & DEV. POL’Y,
TOWARDS A RESENT IN U.S.-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS? (2014), http://isdp.eu/content/up
loads/publications/2014-lee-towards-a-reset-in-us-north-korea-relations.pdf  at 1 (argu-
ing that US detainees were being used “as a bargaining chip so as to obtain a high-
ranking visit from Washington”) [https://perma.cc/WUK8-V3BW]; North Korea to Issue
Verdict on US Citizen, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
22320287  (quoting Dongguk University Professor Koh Yu-hwan as stating that “For
North Korea, Bae is a bargaining chip in dealing with the US.”) [https://perma.cc/F2BR-
RHH3].
194. Jonathan Cheng, U.S. Ex-Detainee in North Korea Tells Cautionary Tale, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ex-detainee-in-north-korea-tells-cau-
tionary-tale-1460861223 [ ]https://perma.cc/T4TL-LGP2]; Three Detained Americans in
North Korea Presented to Media, CBS NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/three-detained-americans-in-north-korea-presented-to-media/ (citing Bae, Miller
and Fowler’s statement that they believed they would only be released if a U.S. represen-
tative comes to Korea to make a direct appeal) [https://perma.cc/937F-24TZ].
195. CA 7048/97 Anonymous (Lebanese citizens) v. Minister of Defense, (2000)
(Isr.).
196. North Korea Threatens US Prisoner Aijalon Gomes, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2010),
http://www.bbc.com/news/10401853 [https://perma.cc/VE59-XC9T].
197. Dana Ford, State Media: U.S. Man Sentenced in North Korea not a ‘Bargaining
Chip’, CNN (May 6, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/05/world/asia/north-
korea-american-sentenced/ [https://perma.cc/6LYA-LHFX].
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be communicated to a third party, as long as the intent to compel exists.198
It is less certain whether individuals detained between 2008 and
November 2017 would be able to file suit.  The FSIA requires that a foreign
state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time that the
litigated act occurred, or was so designated as a result of such act.199  In
addition, there is a ten-year statute of limitation for suits under
§ 1605A(b)(2), although courts have held that under principles of equity,
the statute of limitations can be tolled for the period during which a for-
eign state enjoyed immunity.200  Even after North Korea’s reinstatement on
the list of state sponsors of terrorism, other hurdles may remain for any
detainees’ TVPA claim.  For one thing, the FSIA only lifts immunity in
cases of death or personal injury, and it is not clear that recent detainees
(Warmbier excepted) have suffered a personal injury, even where they can
make a colorable claim that they were held hostage.201
While this Article only addresses recourse against North Korea, it is
worth noting that detainees and their families may also have tort claims
against tour companies or others involved in their travel to North Korea.
For example, the liability of Young Pioneer Tours (the China-based com-
pany with which Warmbier traveled to North Korea) has been questioned,
given their student targeting and claims that North Korea is a safe country
to visit.202  They have since ceased accepting U.S. citizens as tour
members.203
D. State-to-State Action
Finally, it is worth briefly considering possible venues if detainees are
able to enlist the U.S. government to assert a state-to-state claim against
North Korea on their behalf.  As a starting point, dispute settlement at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) would not likely be available for
breaches of VCCR, because neither North Korea nor the U.S. have made
declarations accepting the court’s compulsory jurisdiction,204 nor have
198. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 362 F.Supp. 2d 103, 113 (DDC 2005).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
200. Massie, supra note 176, at 73; Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1195-96 R
(D.C.Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f)); Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 470 F.3d 356, 418 (2006).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).
202. See Anna Fifield, After Otto Warmbier’s Death, Tourism to North Korea comes
under Scrutiny, WASH. POST (June 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/after-otto-warmbiers-death-tourism-to-north-korea-comes-under-scrutiny/
2017/06/20/e0e7fa20-55ab-11e7-9e18-968f6ad1e1d3_story.html [https://perma.cc/
9BQ6-HQ46].
203. Id.
204. Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory, Int’l Ct. Just.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (the U.S. withdrew its prior
acceptance of the optional clause after losing the Nicaragua case) [https://perma.cc/
2UZ3-YN4N]; See also Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial
Body, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/us-
says-it-has-withdrawn-from-world-judicial-body.html (the U.S. withdrew its prior accept-
ance of the optional clause after losing the Nicaragua case) [https://perma.cc/7PUH-
DHV2].
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either state accepted compulsory ICJ dispute settlement in the VCCR.205
Another possibility would be the ICCPR, which includes a state-to-state
complaint mechanism involving the Human Rights Committee and, if nec-
essary, an ad hoc Conciliation Commission.206  Here too, however, North
Korea has not accepted the optional state-to-state dispute settlement
clauses (although the U.S. has done so).207  It should also be noted that the
ICCPR state-to-state dispute settlement system so far exists more in the
realm of ideal than reality; no country has yet filed a dispute against
another state, under the ICCPR or any other UN human rights treaty.208
While venues for a state-to-state complaint may be hard to come by,
there are of course other ways that the U.S. can choose to highlight North
Korean actions at the international level.  The detention of U.S. citizens can
be included among the other human rights abuses that are condemned on
an annual basis by the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assem-
bly.209  Such detentions can also be brought up in the UN Security Coun-
cil, which has begun to discuss North Korean human rights issues more
actively in the wake of the Commission of Inquiry report.210  The U.S. may
also choose to take action outside of international institutions to punish
North Korea for violating international law in its detentions of U.S. nation-
als.  For example, the U.S. could condemn such detentions in its human
rights reports about North Korea.211  It could also strengthen existing uni-
lateral sanctions against North Korea as a response.212  However, a particu-
larly strong response might endanger the lives or delay the release of
detainees.
205. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, United Nations Treaty Collection, updated Jan. 31,
2018, (the U.S. withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR concerning the Com-
pulsory Settlement of Disputes in 2005).
206. ICCPR, supra note 19, arts. 41– 42. R
207. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, UN Treaty Collection,
updated Jan. 31, 2018, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/V3HS-3PP9].
208. Human Rights Bodies –  Complaints Procedures, UN Office of the High Comm. Of
Hum. Rts., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx
#interstate [https://perma.cc/EH43-YPAR].
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05.html [https://perma.cc/F9V5-6QEA]; Jee Abbey Lee, UN Condemns North Korea’s
Human Rights Violations, VOA NEWS (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/a/un-
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Conclusion
The detention of U.S. citizens is a cautionary tale for all travelers to
North Korea who risk behavior antagonistic to the North Korean govern-
ment.  The criminal codes are both exhaustive yet vague in their application
to both citizens and non-citizens alike.  The danger of the North Korean
criminal system lies in the discretion of the authorities to determine the
severity of a crime prior to judicial determination.  The domestic legal cul-
ture of interrogating until confession evokes a pattern of torture found
worldwide where authorities harass individuals until they extract informa-
tion to serve as the sole basis of evidence for prosecution.  The superior
authority of the Ministry of State Security for “anti-state” crimes over the
judiciary illustrates the hierarchical relations between the prosecutorial
and judicial mechanisms, the latter of which then serves more of a sentenc-
ing function than as an independent decision-maker.
U.S. detainees have experienced this legal process, undergoing intense
investigations without the right to remain silent, without rigorous legal
advocacy, and without the right to appeal.  In the cases at hand, there has
always been some triggering conduct on the part of the individual to form
the basis for an arrest, investigation, and charge.  The issue is whether
these detentions in substance and procedure violate international legal
norms.  On the whole, the North Korean government has treated U.S.
detainees better than their own citizens accused of crimes against the state,
particularly in terms of treatment and conditions during detention and
imprisonment, as well as the feasibility of being released contingent on
beneficial negotiations with the U.S. government.
Despite criminal law violations from the perspective of the North
Korean government, the detention of U.S. citizens nonetheless violates
international law in several respects, especially the VCCR and the ICCPR.
Unfortunately, there may be little chance for detainees to obtain recourse
for these violations.  The most plausible international forum for a com-
plaint would be the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, but its recom-
mendations are not considered binding under international law and would
likely be ignored by the North Korean government.  Private suits under
U.S. law may now be possible, however, due to North Korea’s reenlistment
as a state sponsor of terrorism.
In the last century, international law has developed a robust set of
norms for the protection of individuals from mistreatment at the hands of
the state.  The enforcement of those norms is another matter.  With the
partial exception of certain regional human rights regimes, there is usually
little hope for individual victims to receive recourse.  This is especially true
for individuals suffering at the hands of a state like North Korea that is not
a full participant in the international system.  Diplomatic measures con-
tinue to be the usual alternative path for resolution, but the current envi-
ronment of sanctions has made it more difficult to negotiate the release of
the current detainees through official government channels.  U.S. detainees
fall victim not only to the North Korean legal system but also to the limita-
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tions of international law and the contentious relationship between North
Korea and the United States.
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